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INTERPRETING RAHNER'S METAPHORIC LOGIC
ROBERT MASSON

Recent provocative reinterpretations of Karl Rahner's theology
illustrate the hermeneutical challenge of retrieving his achievement
for a new era. The spectrum of positions is exemplified by Karen
Kilby, Patrick Burke, and Philip Endean. The essay proposes an
alternative interpretive scheme attentive to Rahner's metaphoric
logic.

A

GENERATION OF SCHOLARS is raising fundamental questions
about the balance, coherence, and foundations of Rahner's theology.
They are bringing new questions and theological contexts to his thought
and bringing Rahner's thought to bear on questions that had not been at
the center of his attention—if on his horizon at all. While many of his
former students and disciples have been content to explain and interpret
Rahner in his own terms, this new generation seeks explanatory schemes
that are not at all or much less dependent on his own conceptual framework
and technical vocabulary. In critically engaging Rahner's texts, they take
apparent discontinuities seriously while eschewing both overly generous
harmonizations and unsympathetic caricatures. Their readings of Rahner
illustrate the hermeneutical challenge of retrieving his achievement for a
new theological era.
The spectrum of reinterpretations is exemplified by Karen Kilby, Patrick
Burke, and Philip Endean.1 Others could be cited, but these three illustrate
NEW
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1

See Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (New York:
Routledge, 2004), a revision of her dissertation, "The Vorgriff auf esse: A Study in
the Relation of Philosophy to Theology in the Thought of Karl Rahner" (Ph.D.,
diss., Yale University, 1994); Patrick J. Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical
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both the breadth of interpretations and the concern that something is out of
balance in conventional accounts. Kilby proposes to save Rahner's thought
by a nonfoundationalist reading. While admitting that this nonfoundationalist reinterpretation does not square with some of Rahner's texts and
explicit positions, she contends that his later theology is incompatible with
the earlier philosophy. In any case, she argues, his theology does not need
his philosophy as a foundation and is more persuasive without it.
Burke, at the other end of the spectrum, defends a thoroughly
foundationalist reinterpretation, suggesting that "dialectical analogy" is
the key to understanding how Rahner endeavors to keep the various polarities of his thought in balance both with each other and with the Catholic
dogmatic tradition. In Burke's view, however, the philosophical grounding
of Rahner's thought is fundamentally flawed. Balance is saved precariously
only by Rahner's genius and personal fidelity to the Church. Ultimately,
the flaws in his philosophical foundations make it difficult for Rahner to
sustain the intended equilibrium—particularly in his later work and in its
appropriation by "Rahnerians" who, Burke suggests, often lack Rahner's
intellectual subtlety and loyalty to Catholic doctrine. This leads Burke, like
Kilby, to challenge standard readings of key positions and texts.
By and large, Endean's reinterpretation coheres more closely with typical lines of Rahnerian scholarship. He argues that the questions about
balance and foundations stem from misreading Rahner's contribution as
simply and primarily a "liberal" corrective to an overemphasis on the
authority of tradition and the institutional Church. That account, however,
misses the fundamental "subversiveness" of Rahner's achievement. So
Endean also argues that the key to interpretation requires a revisionary
account with respect to conventional understandings of Rahner's project.
I propose an alternative explanatory scheme for reading Rahner. While
my hermeneutic shares Endean's fundamental position on the originality of
Rahner's thought, it looks for a more precise description of exactly how
Rahner's metaphoric logic reframes the conventional theological fields of
meanings and thus avoids difficulties such as those associated with either
foundationalism or nonfoundationalism. This article is merely a sketch.
Articulating an alternative reading would require its own book-length
study. Likewise, the three commentators' extensive exposition and argumentation call for much thicker analyses than can be provided in an article.
Study of His Major Themes (New York: Fordham University, 2002); Burke, "Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 65-93; Philip Endean
"Has Rahnerian Theology a Future?" in The Cambridge Companion to Karl
Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (New York: Cambridge University, 2005) 281-96; Endean, "Karl Rahner im englischsprachigen Raum," Stimmen
der Zeit, special issue on Rahner, 222 (2004) 57-74; and Endean, Karl Rahner and
Ignatian Spirituality (New York: Oxford University, 2001).
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Although much in their reinterpretations is contentious, they are not
merely "cherry picking," to use Endean's colorful description of authors
who pull out ideas from Rahner's work with absolutely no regard for their
2
grounding in his larger theological vision. Rather, these readings arise
from opposed ways of framing the interpretation. The framing is key to
the projects. Hence my focus will be on the framing of interpretation—both
their framing and Rahner's—as key to moving discussion forward.
NONFOUNDATIONALISM AS INTERPRETIVE KEY
Karen Kilby reads Rahner through a strong nonfoundationalist lens. She
argues that this corrects common misreadings and makes it possible to
bring his thought more directly into conversation with influential currents
in philosophy and theology in the English-speaking world. For the moment,
my objective is to describe how she frames this reading rather than to
3
contest her interpretation of particular texts and conceptions. My assess
ment of her strategy and the readings to which it leads will be elaborated in
due course.
Kilby grants that foundationalism is primarily "a term of criticism, a way
of identifying what is problematic in another person's position."4 In philos
ophy the issue is an overreaction to skepticism—an "excessive desire for
certainty, for intellectual security and closure; it is philosophy over
reaching itself."5 In theology the difficulty is "the assumption that Christian
beliefs, if they are to be justified, require a foundation in something inde
pendent of and prior to the Christian faith."6 She admits that "one meets
few self-described foundationalists."7 Moreover, she concedes that her
nonfoundationalist prescription applies a focus on Rahner's work that was
not his own. Nevertheless, she argues, the lens is appropriate because so
many of the criticisms aimed at Rahner—and defenses—interpret his work
either explicitly or implicitly in foundationalist or semifoundationalist
terms.
The primary advantage of a nonfoundationalist reading, for Kilby, is that
it unhinges Rahner's theological insights from philosophical positions that
have been the source of criticism and that she herself judges unpersuasive.
Second, this reading accounts for shifts that she discerns between Rahner's
earlier philosophical work and his theology. Third, her reinterpretation
2

Endean, "Karl Rahner im englischsprachigen Raum" 62,73 η. 20.
I take this course because her interpretation of Rahner, as well as her responses
to the standard Rahnerian interpretations, is driven by the framing. Disputes about
the meaning of particular texts, philosophical conceptions, and theological notions
are unlikely to progress without clarification of that larger framing of the issues.
4
5
Kilby, Karl Rahner 2.
Ibid. 5.
6
7
Ibid. 6.
Ibid. 2.
3
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proposes to overcome inherent tensions and inconsistencies within his the
ology. Finally, she contends that Rahner's appeal to "pre-thematic experi
ence," which is commonly read as playing a foundational role, "is best seen
as something to which his theology concludes rather than as its supposed
starting point."8
Kilby's construal of Rahner's theology as nonfoundationalist and her
defense of its contribution entail a simultaneous and substantial critique: a
fundamental criticism of his earlier philosophical work, a denial of an
overarching philosophical unity in his thought, as well as affirmation of
significant contradictions within his theology. This prescription puts her at
odds with most of Rahner's critics and admirers, and also with many of his
explicit statements. It is a provocative prescription, but it makes a very
convincing case on behalf of Rahner for those in the English speaking
world whose philosophical leanings are in the Analytic tradition or whose
theological inclinations are Postliberal. The reinterpretation does this by
excising objectionable parts from Rahner on the grounds that they are not
essential to his mature theology and that his theology is more coherent and
persuasive without them.
Kilby first examines Rahner's contention in his early philosophical works
that a Vorgriff auf esse and consequent dynamism toward God is
presupposed in the act of judgment. She provides a concise and rather
standard overview of Rahner's argument that the recognition of particular
beings in abstraction ultimately presupposes a grasp of being-as-such. She
does "not offer anything like an exhaustive critique here," 9 but she assesses
this argument in Spirit in the World from a philosophical perspective very
different from Rahner's. Rahnerians would contend that this leads to egre
gious misunderstandings. In any case, appealing to fundamental doubts that
Wittgensteinian thinkers would have about Rahner's line of argumenta
tion, Kilby initially asks rhetorically whether he is "being unduly led by
the suggestiveness of Aristotelian/Thomistic language of the matter 'limit
10
ing' the form and of the 'liberation' of forms.'" She objects on narrow
grounds that the argument trades on a pivotal equivocation between the
sort of "limitation" involved in "applying a general (universal) concept to a
particular thing" (e.g., "This is a rabbit.") and a second sort of "limitation"
involved in recognizing that any particular thing "is limited insofar as it is
11
one thing and not everything." Rahner's argument, she concludes, is
"either a tautology or a non sequitur" but hardly a convincing foundationalist
argument for an implicit Vorgriff of being-as-such.12 Kilby then argues
more broadly, on the basis of discussions among Analytic philosophers,
8
10
1 2

Ibid. 10.
Ibid.
ΤΚ;Λ

9
u

Ibid. 29.
Ibid. 30.
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that the very possibility of transcendental arguments is doubtful. The claim
of such demonstrations to have found the one and only condition of possibility to explain a given phenomenon presupposes that all other possible
explanations have been considered and found unwarranted. She contends
that in principle it is impossible to imagine, let alone consider and rule out
as satisfactory, all other possible explanations.13
Kilby adds an indirect and more explicitly theological rationale for a
nonfoundationalist reading. She contends that the argument in Hearer of
the Word and its conception of revelation are at odds with Rahner's later
notion of the supernatural existential.14 In her unorthodox construal,
a sharp either/or distinction runs through Hearer of the Word between
revelation, which is communicated by God, and ordinary human knowledge, which is available through introspection and discursive reasoning.
She interprets the supernatural existential as "a communication of God
that is part of the ordinary human make-up, accessible, however imperfectly, to ordinary means of knowledge."15 If there is a transcendental
supernatural existential that makes God accessible, she asks, then what real
need is there for further historical revelation? On the other hand, if historical revelation is necessary—the position of Hearer of the Word—then on
her view there can be no supernatural existential. She argues that the
disparity between these two positions reveals a fundamental contradiction
between Rahner's earlier philosophical argumentation and his later theological understandings of revelation and grace.
Kilby alleges that the same tension is evident in Rahner's explanation of
the supernatural existential itself. She discerns two versions: a weaker one
that sees the supernatural existential as only a potency for grace, and a
stronger one that identifies the supernatural existential as such with grace
and revelation.16 The stronger version, she contends, puts in question "the
13

Ibid. 43-48.
Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word: Laying the Foundation for a Philosophy of
Religion, ed. and trans. Andrew Talion (New York: Continuum, 1994; originally
published as Hörer des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie
(Munich: Kösel-Pustet, 1941).
15
Rahner, Hearer of the Word 62.
16
In the "weaker version" of the supernatural existential, Kilby reduces God's
actually offered self-communication to a human potency. Her "stronger version"
collapses the distinction between invitation and response. Her analysis misses the
dynamic character of this process for reasons that I will explain later in the article.
David Coffey argues against the notion that Rahner's later reflections on the supernatural existential are in conflict with the earlier writings. In an article published the
same year as Kilby's book, he concludes that "one can say unhesitatingly that the
only major change that occurred was one of context and perspective" (Coffey,
"The Whole Rahner on the Supernatural Existential," Theological Studies 65
[2004] 95-118, at 110).
14
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possibility of a purely philosophical analysis of human nature in the technical sense of the word." That, she believes, was the intention of the early
philosophical works.17 On her reading of Rahner's later theological investigations, philosophy as such can have no genuine role: the presence of the
supernatural existential would mean that philosophy could have "no way of
knowing precisely what belongs to nature and what does not."18 Efforts by
Johannes Metz in the second edition of Hearer of the Word and similar
attempts by Rahnerians to harmonize these themes, Kilby argues, "can
only lead to confusion" because the notions are based on "a different
conception of the way revelation is related to the rest of human experience."19 Rahner contends in Hearer of the Word that God is free to speak
or remain silent. Kilby alleges that this characterization is incompatible
with the conception later in Foundations of Christian Faith that God is
given in the supernatural existential and therefore is not silent.20
For further evidence of the inconsistency, Kilby contrasts Rahner's
emphasis on inescapable pluralism in philosophy and theology with his
appeals to the transcendental. She regards transcendental arguments as
efforts to overcome pluralism through religiously neutral, universally applicable, and logically persuasive demonstrations. One cannot have both transcendental arguments, in this sense, and incorrigible pluralism. She grants
that many interpretations of Rahner are not foundationalist in such a strict
sense but rather "semi-foundationalist." By "semi-foundationalist" she
means interpretations that suppose that only certain key points of his
theology, not the whole of it, are derived from and require the support of
"an independently demonstrated philosophy."21 But even if transcendental
arguments support only particular aspects of Rahner's thought, Kilby holds
that this still relativizes his claims about the inescapability and extent of
pluralism.22 Moreover, on such semifoundationalist readings, if Rahner's
key philosophical demonstrations prove unconvincing, then "large swatches
of Rahner's theology must collapse with it."23
Hence Kilby argues for a nonfoundationalist reading that takes
Rahner's Foundations as paradigmatic, interpreting it "as a work of theology from start to finish, which in fact contains no independent philosophy."24 What looks like philosophy is "pure theology," that is to say,
meant to be judged only on theological grounds according to whether it
contributes to a convincing interpretation of Christianity.25 This reading
17
19

18
Kilby, Karl Rahner 67.
Ibid.
Ibid. 63. Although Metz's revisions in the second edition (Munich: Kösel,
1963) were endorsed by Rahner, the first edition provides a clearer indication of
the20genesis of Rahner's thought.
21
Ibid. 68.
Ibid. 76.
22
23
Ibid. 94.
Ibid. 76.
24
25
Ibid. 79.
Ibid. 81-82.
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takes pluralism seriously, relativizing Rahner's allegedly transcendental
theology as an ad hoc advocacy of one theological position among many.
Kilby argues that there are sound theological reasons for advancing the
Vorgriff auf esse, so use of the notion does not have to appeal to unconvincing philosophical demonstrations that also conflict, on her reading,
with the notion of the supernatural existential. Moreover, she suggests,
both notions and the consequent conceptual framework are not the philosophical basis for Rahner's theology but rather an understanding to
which it concludes.
This reading, which reworks themes from Kilby's dissertation, exemplifies something of a tradition at Yale of advancing schemes for explaining
Rahner framed in terms other than his own. There is much to applaud in
these efforts. Reinterpreting Rahner from the outside, as it were, is essential if Rahner's achievement is to be retrieved for the present and future.
Only a shrinking cadre of scholars is familiar enough with Rahner's Scholastic and transcendental interlocutors to engage explanations articulated
entirely within those frameworks and specialized vocabularies. A broader
reception, even among the current generation of theologians, not to
mention a broader public, will require translation into new theological,
spiritual, and practical idioms.
At the same time, this highlights the significant limitation of Kilby's
reinterpretation. The development of her nonfoundationalist critique
and her exposition of Rahner's thought are interwoven at every stage.
I will return to her proposal in the concluding section where I will argue
that the alleged contradictions are not inherent in Rahner's work but rather
in the interpretive focus Kilby brings to it. Her account hinges on her
narrow construal of philosophy as neutral and universally persuasive
demonstration plotted exclusively at the intersection of foundationalist,
semifoundationalist, and nonfoundationalist axes. In Endean I will find a
persuasive argument against taking foundationalism in this way as a
hegemonic interpretive key. I will argue, further, that there is an alternative
way to interpret Rahner "from the outside" that does not require playing
off the earlier philosophical work against the later theological investigations, and that avoids the dangers of foundationalism without requiring
Kilby's strained readings of Rahner's texts—often against their presumptive meanings.26

Kilby, of course, while admitting that Rahner at some points "sounds more of
a semi-foundationalist than a non-foundationalist" (ibid. 99), would insist that the
consensus among Rahnerians about the presumptive meanings of his texts presupposes the foundationalist reading and coherence of the early philosophical and later
theological work that her nonfoundationalist reading challenges.
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DIALECTICAL ANALOGY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY

Patrick Burke reads Rahner quite differently than Kilby but still presumes a foundationalist axis of interpretation. He argues that "Rahner's
theology is rightly recognized as a theological system because of the
fundamental unity that runs throughout his writings."27 Burke maintains
that the key to this unity was elaborated in Spirit in the World and
Hearer of the Word.28 "Those who attempt to interpret Rahner without
reference to these early philosophical writings or who dismiss them as
unconnected to his later theology not only misunderstand him but also
run the risk of distorting his remarkably nuanced and balanced system
of thought."29
At the heart of Rahner's "system," Burke contends, is "dialectical
analogy." This is a term he uses, following his mentor John McDermott, to
characterize—in a way at odds with most Rahner scholars—the foundational principle of Rahner's metaphysics, epistemology, and theology.30 My
first objective, as with Kilby above, is to describe how Burke employs this
notion to frame his reinterpretation of Rahner. My assessment follows.
Burke and McDermott contend that the dialectical analogy manifests
itself in Spirit in the World's description of human knowing as a dynamic
hovering, or Schwebe, between the horizon of being and the sensible
singular.31 The metaphysical grounding for this, they argue, is in humanity's
very structure as finite, embodied spirit, which Rahner envisions as
Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner vii.
Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York: Continuum,
1994; originally published as Geist in Welt: Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis
bei Thomas von Aquin, ed. Johannes Baptist Metz [Munich: Kösel, 1957]).
29
Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner viii.
30
For a very different interpretation see Leo O'Donovan, "Karl Rahner, S J
(1904-84): A Theologian for the Twenty-First Century," Theology Today 62
(2005) 352-63, at 359 n. 23; here O'Donovan disputes this translation and interpretation of Schwebe as "quite contrary to Rahner's clear intention." While O'Donovan, in my estimation, clarifies the many ways Rahner uses the term "dialectic" and
clearly lays out the central notions in Rahner that speak against Burke's reading,
my concern here is to offer a further hermeneutical explanation about why Rahner
is often misread by interpreters like Burke.
31
See the following by John M. McDermott: "A New Approach to God's
Existence," Thomist" 44 (1980) 219-50; "The Christologies of Karl Rahner,
Part 1," Gregorianum 67 (1986) 87-123; "The Christologies of Karl Rahner, Part 2,"
Gregorianum 67 (1986) 297-327; "Sheehan, Rousselot, and Theological Method,"
Gregorianum 68 (1987) 705-17; "Karl Rahner on Two Infinities: God and Matter,"
International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1988) 439-57; "Dialectical Analogy: The
Oscillating Center of Rahner's Thought," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 675-703; and
"The Analogy of Knowing in Karl Rahner," International-Philosophical-Quarterly
36 (1996) 201-16.
28
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a "dynamic oscillating midpoint between God and the categorical world."
But it is not just a matter of human knowing hovering between spirit and
matter. Burke postulates a further epistemological oscillation. As one
hovers between spirit and matter, one also moves either toward their
unification or toward their divergence and distinction. Burke identifies
the former with the unifying dynamism of judgment and the latter with
conceptual distinction and abstraction. He characterizes the latter as static
since, as he understands it, concepts abstract from time and place. He
calls "this structure dialectical analogy because through it Rahner oscillated constantly between unifying dynamism and conceptual distinction
and therefore united dialectically while still holding in distinction the
traditional antinomies of Christian thought—God and the world, spirit
and matter, grace and nature."33 According to Burke's interpretation,
"this complex and nuanced structure gave Rahner's thought remarkable
balance and flexibility, allowing him to develop a theological system that
was both new and dynamic and that also maintained all the distinctions
necessary for orthodox Christianity."34 The greater part of Burke's reinterpretation aims to show how Rahner employed dialectical analogy as a
principle for grounding Christian doctrinal claims metaphysically and for
explaining them theologically. He is particularly concerned to demonstrate, first, how the principle works in Rahner's theology to preserve
both the unity and crucial distinctions between, for example, the natural
and the supernatural in creation and grace, the human and divine in
Jesus, and the changeable and unchangeable in dogma. Second, he
endeavors to expose significant tensions within Rahner's thought that
need to be "addressed by Rahnerian scholars if the complex and profound
balance of his theological vision is not to be endangered or even lost."35
The problem with Rahner's use of this principle, on Burke's reading, is
that it is not adequately grounded metaphysically. Although Rahner
declares his commitment to both sides of the polarity, his defense for this
assertion is at best "weak."36 This undercuts Rahner's dialectical analogy
itself and according to Burke is the source of critical ambiguities throughout his theology. The basis for Burke's critique is worked out more fully in
his article "Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner."37 His analysis focuses on
issues of Thomist metaphysics and is quite technical but for these reasons
also somewhat more illuminating than his book. Burke situates his discussion in the context of the Church's rejection of Modernism and nominalism.
32
Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner viii. Although "categorical" is frequently used in
translations of Rahner's work, it has connotations in English that are misleading.
I will
use "categorial" instead.
33
34
Ibid.
Ibid.
35
36
Ibid.
xi.
Ibid. viii.
37
Burke, "Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 65-93.
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He takes it as axiomatic that any relativization of conceptual knowledge
undermines the validity of dogmatic affirmations. He contends that "traditional Thomists, following Cajetan, always maintained that man could
know reality through his concepts; in this way they defended human reason
from the challenge of nominalism."38 Thinkers such as Jacques Maritain
stressed "the concept of being as the basis of metaphysics" because "if
being is conceptualizeable, all reality can be known through concepts."39
Burke insists that "even when Etienne Gilson maintained that Thomas
arrived at reality through the existential judgement, he in no way put into
doubt the validity of conceptual knowledge obtained by abstracting
essences from sensible realities."40
Burke contends that in both Maritain and Gilson the passive intellect,
seen as a separate faculty, played a key role in this process of abstracting
the essence from the sensible reality. In Spirit in the World, Rahner collapses the distinction between the active and passive intellects.41 For him,
sensibility, which emanates from spirit, becomes the receptive faculty of
human knowledge with the result that "conceptual thought is defined, not
as the liberation of the 'pure form' from its material supposite, but merely
as the recognition by the active intellect of the sensibly perceived object as
limited, repeatable, and hence universal."42 Moreover, Burke continues,
Rahner insists that such abstracted concepts are always grasped only in
reference to some concrete subject. As a result "the form/concept, for
Rahner, is never fully 'abstracted' or 'isolated' from time or space, as it
was in the Cajetanian tradition."43 At this point it is evident that Burke
envisions only two alternatives: either a nominalist claim that concepts
have no objective referents or Burke's interpretation of conceptualist Thomism in which concepts grasp essences as "pure forms" that are entirely
abstracted and isolated from time and space. He assumes that if Rahner
does not ground concepts in some way analogous to conceptualist Thomism,44 his efforts to forge an intrinsically balanced system cannot be saved
38

39
Ibid. 86.
Ibid. 80.
Ibid.
41
In Reinterpreting Rahner 31-32 n. 84, Burke argues that Rahner's understanding of this distinction "has been criticized widely as inadequate and untrue to
Thomas," citing his own essay and earlier work by Cornelio Fabro, Peter Eicher,
Josef Speck, and his mentor McDermott.
42
Burke, "Conceptual Thought" 83.
43
Ibid. 84.
44
"By conceptualist Thomism is intended that interpretation of St. Thomas's
thought which maintains that esse can be grasped in an analogous concept and
consequently that all reality can be conceptualized. The tradition of Cajetan and
John of St. Thomas most strongly defended this position" (John M. McDermott,
"The Analogy of Knowing in Karl Rahner," International Philosophical
Quarterly 36 [1996] 102-16, at 206).
40

390

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

from readings that collapse into a Modernist relativization of dogma. Burke
suggests that Thomas Sheehan's "atheological" interpretation of Rahner
illustrates the room left for later Rahnerians to take such paths that undermine the very possibility of objective truth claims and doctrine.45
These difficulties, Burke tells us, are reaffirmed in Foundations where
Rahner addresses the analogy of being. In conventional Thomism the ability to grasp the world in valid concepts provides analogies for conceiving
the reality of God. Rahner, on the other hand, argues that our transcendental experience is original and primary. Burke quotes a crucial passage from
Foundations:
Transcendence is the more original in relation to individual, categorical, univocal
concepts. For transcendence, that is, reaching beyond towards the unlimited horizon of the whole movement of our spirit, is precisely the condition of possibility, the
horizon and the basis and ground by means of which we compare individual objects
of experience with one another and classify them.46
Burke recognizes how innovative this notion of analogy is. Rahner emphasizes that "analogy, therefore, has nothing to do with the notion of a secondary, inexact middle position between clear concepts and those which
designate two completely different things with the same phonetic sound."47
Rather, analogy refers to this original tension between our categorial
starting point and the incomprehensibility of God. 48 Burke interprets
this analogy as corresponding again to the oscillation of the human spirit
between experience of the concrete sensible and experience of God as
holy mystery. But he wonders how the analogy can ever be adequately
grounded. "Within this knowing process there seems to be no prime
analogate. Man has analogous knowledge of God from his experience of
earthly realities, and an analogous knowledge of earthly realities from his
transcendental experience of God."49 The result, Burke concludes, is that
concepts are always and only approximations of the subject's experience of
reality, "and it is, therefore, difficult to see how the concept has not been
already and always relativized, existing only as a shadow of the reality it
seeks to capture."50 While Rahner and "the best Transcendental Thomists
have always sought to maintain the validity of conceptual knowledge, lest
dogma be relativized and Modernism reemerge," Burke doubts whether
in the end Rahner adequately grounds the validity of conceptual thought
45
See Thomas Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens:
Ohio University, 1987); and The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became
Christianity (New York: Random House, 1986).
46
Burke, "Conceptual Thought" 89-90, quoting Rahner, Foundations 72.
47
Rahner, Foundations 72.
48
Ibid.73. See note 30 above regarding the use of "categorial" rather than "categorical."
49
Burke, "Conceptual Thought" 91. 50 Ibid. 92.
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over against this stress on the transcendental, intuitive, nonconceptual
grasp of reality.51
Each thematic chapter in Burke's Reinterpreting Rahner concludes its
exposition with a summary of the tensions and ambiguities inherent in
Rahner's positions. Most of this is derived from earlier critiques.52 What is
original, but very much open to question, is whether oscillation between
unifying dynamism and static conceptualization is the key to understanding
what Rahner is up to in the instances cited and whether it is his "weakness"
in grounding the latter that "accounts for the progressively stronger
emphasis on the dynamic, unifying side of his thought in his later works."53
Burke identifies this alleged weakness as both the source of serious ambiguities and "also the reason why so many commentators have pushed
Rahner's system further than Rahner himself either went or would have
gone."54 Burke contends that "sensing the inconsistency of the conceptualizing moment within the knowing process and also the priority of the
dynamism in his later development, these commentators all too often have
interpreted Rahner according to only one side of his thought. In doing so,
they not infrequently have lost the balance and nuance of Rahner's original
perspective."55
While I can see no reason to quarrel with the generalization that a
central feature of Rahner is his consistent affirmation of the balance
between our unity with and distinction from God, and the many theological
variations on that motif, the crucial questions are how to conceive that
balance, whether Burke's interpretation of it as a hovering dialectical analogy describes it accurately, and whether foundationalism is the most helpful interpretive key for approaching the issue. I mentioned earlier in my
discussion of Kilby that Endean offers a persuasive argument against making foundationalism the primary interpretive lens for reading Rahner. I will
consider this next. In my final section I will argue for a different conclusion
and an alternative interpretive scheme.
SELF-DISCLOSING MYSTERY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY

Endean does not comment explicitly on Kilby or Burke, but he questions
whether foundationalism is the most helpful interpretive lens through
which to read Rahner. That way of framing the issue gets at a partial truth
but misses the most significant feature of Rahner's achievement. Endean
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agrees that it has been common for both followers and critics to focus on
Rahner's contribution to a liberalization in Catholic theology and ecclesiology in the years before and after Vatican II. He cites the assessments of
Anne Carr and Hans Urs von Balthasar as typical: in their interpretations
"Rahner appears as a man struggling to hold together two potentially
competing values: grace present universally in human experience at large,
and the external authority of the Church and its tradition."56 Carr regards
Rahner's approach as creative and as a renewal of Catholic identity;
Balthasar regards it as confused and as a seductive threat. Like Burke on
this matter, Endean holds "that a correct reading of Rahner depends on
recognizing that this temptation [giving systematic preference to one value
at the expense of the other] is to be avoided."57
Unlike Burke or Kilby, however, Endean cautions against framing the
interpretation of Rahner narrowly in terms of the struggle in the Church
between liberal and conservative responses to modernity. One problem
with that account is the implication that any theology that offers a more
nuanced explanation of the limitations of authority and tradition is inevitably taken as advocacy of the cause ascribed to Liberal Protestantism and
Catholic Modernism. Rahner's contribution to aggiornamento in Catholic
theology tells only half the story. Contrary to Burke and Kilby, Endean
argues that "it is an error to see Rahner's most characteristic insights as a
response to the 'problems of the modern world.'"58 Rahner was also conscious of "how 'modern' patterns of thought and affiliation distort the
reality of Catholic, Christian, truth," and he endeavored to correct that
tendency as well.59 It was not just a matter of maintaining the dialectic
between one side or the other, as Burke argues. Nor was it simply a matter
of adjusting traditional theological notions to accommodate a greater
appreciation of modernity's emphasis on the dynamic, the subject, and
historicity, which Burke suggests was Rahner's weakness and which
Kilby argues was his strength. In Endean's view, Rahner sought to subvert
that very way of framing the question. "The conventional picture of Rahner
obscures how he was trying to move Christianity forward from the deficient
epistemology which gave rise to a sense of inevitable conflict between
tradition and innovation."60
Endean, citing his own study of Rahner and Ignatian spirituality
and Schwerdtfeger's research drawing on Finnish Lutheran theologian
Tuomo Mannermaa, argues that Rahner's biography indicates a different
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trajectory. 61 Rahner's most creative theological insights developed when
he was "a young man, in isolated academic and seminary settings." 62
They emerged in reaction to the Scholastic theology of his professors, from
his study of Scripture and historical theology, and from his formation in
the Spiritual Exercises, although Endean cautions against overemphasizing
the latter's influence.63 He gives a lucid and concise summary of his
conclusions:
Rahner's account of how we know God's grace privileges neither subject nor object.
Our discoveries in knowledge are essentially interactive: the external object can
affect us only if there is a disposition within us; and this disposition becomes
conscious only when the object affects the human mind from outside. The fundamental reliability of the system is not directly accessible either through the subject
or the object, but rather through a God who is source of both and works through
both in ways that are quite mysterious.64
This interpretation, in contrast to Kilby's and Burke's, emphasizes how
Rahner's view subverts both poles of the foundationalist/nonfoundationalist scheme and any mediating semifoundationalist positions. Rahner's
"epistemology of self-disclosing mystery" resituates the relationship between
nature and grace, and between all the related antinomies of Christian faith.
Endean likens the effect of this epistemology to the way Wittgenstein's
critique of ostensive definition as normative subverted the conventional
interpretation of how language refers.65
To speak of a "purely philosophical" foundationalism as opposed to a
"purely theological" nonfoundationalism, as Kilby does, is foreign to
Rahner. He does not privilege one over the other. Nor does his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, or grace and nature,
oppose them in the manner suggested by Burke's conception of dialectical
analogy. In that sense, but only in that sense, I would concur, and suspect
Endean would, with the description of Rahner as nonfoundationalist.
But this would not mean that the way to save Rahner from the difficulties of foundationalism is to reject his earlier philosophical work as
foundationalist in favor of his later allegedly nonfoundationalist theology.
Rahner's thought does not have to be saved by a nonfoundationalist reading because he never advocated foundationalism. Reinterpreting Rahner as
a foundationalist, semifoundationalist, or nonfoundationalist distorts his
position. Rahner's thought subverts that grid in favor of an alternative
logic. On the one hand, he never proposed that theology depends in a
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foundationalist way on an independent and prior philosophy. On the other
hand, he consistently held that philosophy is distinct from theology and has
its own integrity even as it plays a genuine role in theological reflection.
Likewise, while a "dialectic" of sorts does situate the human between the
finite and infinite, the dialectic is not founded on a Schwebe—and particularly not if this is understood as a hovering back and forth between opposed
poles (grace over against nature, the divine over against the human, the
supernatural over against the natural, the transcendent over against the
categorial, the eschatological over against the provisional, the unchangeable over against the changeable). These are not opposed poles. The
destiny and meaning of creation are realized in the dialogue between
humanity and God initiated by God's mysterious self-communication in
our midst, that is to say, by God's self-communication in Jesus and his
Spirit. Consequently the divine is ultimately mediated through Jesus in
our very humanity with all its embodied, interpersonal, social, historical,
and cultural density. This conception of God's self-disclosing mystery
highlighted in Endean's reinterpretation privileges neither the sort
of "purely" theological grounding that Kilby espouses nor the "purely"
philosophical foundation Burke supposes.
METAPHORIC ANALOGY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY

Endean summarizes his reading of Rahner in terms based on "what
Chesterton once said about Christianity: It is not that Rahner's theology
has been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and therefore
not really tried."66 This is a colorful exaggeration. Endean has in view
primarily misreadings of Rahner in religious journalism or by theological
critics who have read Rahner superficially or who, like Balthasar, start with
fundamentally different intuitions about the sort of witness that revelation
in Christ makes possible and requires.67 Such differences in fundamental
intuitions and whatever dissimilarities derive from framing interpretations
on modernity's foundationalist/nonfoundationalist axis offer only partial
explanations of the divergent readings. These explanations do not satisfactorily account for why commentators such as Kilby and Burke, who could
hardly be described as merely "cherry picking," come to conclusions that
differ so much from each other, as well as from the interpretations of more
conventional Rahnerians. Moreover, Kilby and Burke are just two examples. Others could be cited. Also to be explained are the significant divergences even among those whom Kilby and Burke apparently group
together as Rahnerians, for example, between Thomas Sheehan's reading
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and the influential interpretations in the English-speaking world of
American Jesuits who studied under Rahner such as William Dych, Leo
O'Donovan, and Harvey Egan.68
Kilby, Burke, and Endean note other partial explanations for the divergence. Much of Rahner's writing had an occasional nature and was not
always precise or consistent. Endean observes, for example, that when
Rahner "was focusing on one particular problem, he had the habit of
presupposing conventional positions . . . on other problems. This he could
do, even when he himself had elsewhere criticized these conventional
accounts radically. It follows," Endean concludes, "that a hostile critic
could certainly find evidence to make a case for incoherence in Rahner's
writings regarding experience and authority."69 But the people in question,
despite their reservations and critiques, intend attentive and in many
respects sympathetic readings. The divergence of interpretations and
the confidence with which they are advanced beg for a clearer and fuller
explanation.
Endean is correct in suggesting that the divergence stems from readers
missing the fundamentally subversive character of Rahner's epistemology
of self-disclosing mystery. But Endean's understanding of that epistemology does not differ substantially from that of many, if not most, Rahner
scholars. His reading is consistent, for example, with interpreters such as
Dych, O'Donovan, and Egan. Why do Kilby and Burke miss what others
take as so central? The incorrigibility of such divergent interpretations
requires something more than yet another insider's exposition of Rahner's
epistemology and its implications. It requires a more precise and constructive description of how Rahner's conceptual moves are subversive. How
exactly does Rahner subvert and reframe the theological terrain? Why is
the subversion apparently obvious to some interpreters yet missed by
others? My intent in raising these questions is neither merely to defend
conventional interpretations of Rahner nor to deny any value to alternative
readings. My goal is (1) to explain how the logic of Rahner's thinking and
particularly how specific steps in his argumentation enable such divergent
readings, and (2) to propose some criteria for interpretation.
Put simply, I believe the divergence of readings lies in the metaphoric
character of Rahner's thought. I could say "analogical" here as well as
"metaphoric," but it will be important to understand how what I mean by
68
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"metaphoric analogy" differs from what Burke and McDermott have in
mind when they speak of "dialectical analogy."
Metaphoric Analogy

The concept of metaphoric analogy that I am proposing is not derived
directly from Rahner. I believe there is some virtue in this. I acknowledged
earlier that, given the difficulty of Rahner's thought and its specialized
vocabulary, it is helpful to offer ways of explaining what he is doing that
do not presuppose his framework from the start.70 "Metaphoric analogy" is
derived from Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell's conception of metaphoric
process.71 This conception offers a new way of describing a key aspect of
Aquinas's use of analogous language—at least as David Burrell interprets
it.72 A brief digression explaining Gerhart and Russell's conception and my
application of it to BurrelPs reading of Aquinas will prepare for the further
application of "metaphoric analogy" to describe the logic of Rahner's
thought.
Burrell suggests that to understand Aquinas's thought, it is crucial to
focus on how he uses analogous language. If we do this, he claims, it
becomes apparent that Aquinas's appeal to analogy at its core is not proposing any sort of direct comparison (whether of proportion, proportionality, or attribution) between some natural reality and God. Rather, Aquinas
stretches our usual ways of speaking to lead us to insights we could not
otherwise reach. For example, on Burrell's reading, when Aquinas speaks
of God's simplicity, he is not pointing to some experience of simplicity in
the natural world that is in some ways like and in some ways different from
divine simplicity. The logic of his appeal is just the opposite. He observes
70
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that we understand natural realities by locating them in terms of various
kinds of composition (form and matter, essence and existence, act and
potency, substance and accident, genus and species, etc.). Aquinas demonstrates that if God is to be what Christian faith confesses, then none of
these conceptual approaches enables us to grasp God, at least in any way
comparable to natural realities. To say that God is simple in this sense, it
turns out, is to stretch toward an idea of simplicity that has no comparison
to what we experience as simplicity in any worldly reality.
Of the composites just mentioned, the crucial couplet in Aquinas's talk
about God is essence and existence. But in the case of God, Aquinas says
the most extraordinary thing: that God's essence is esse, or being-as-such.
The difficulty with this affirmation is that "being" is not a predicate in the
normal sense. Analytical philosophers who seized on such use of "being" as
a category error are correct that the rules of predication are broken in this
statement. Aquinas is using an assertion (a claim that something is) as a
predication (a statement that something has this or that quality). So again,
this "analogous" use of language does not deliver a concept for God that in
some ways is like and in some ways different from our concepts of natural
realities. Aquinas is stretching language, breaking one of the most fundamental rules of discourse (the distinction between saying that something is
and saying what it is) to intimate a divine reality that is beyond the grasp of
any concepts.
We can go beyond BurrelPs analysis, but in a way consistent with it, by
noting that, on this reading, when St. Thomas says that God is simple, or
that God's being is "to be," he affirms an identity and "forces an analogy"
in a unexpected way between two known concepts. Given the conventional
world of meanings the analogy is unwarranted. The consequence of forcing
the analogy between the concepts is that it changes the field of meanings
associated with both. If God is simple in the way suggested, then we are
intimating a concept of simplicity that is like no other. I say "intimating,"
because the point is that we cannot locate what simplicity means here
except by distinguishing how this meaning is different from any of the other
ways that we might affirm simplicity of something. Likewise, if God is
simple in this way, then "God" (and the concept "God") also must be
affirmed in distinction from every other being (and every other concept).
God cannot be thought of as another reality in the world or even outside it,
except in a very different way. To say that God is simple in this way opens
up very different conceptual space for thinking about what simplicity is and
who God is. The logic of simplicity in this changed and new field of meanings is different from simplicity in the conventional senses of the term. It is
likewise for the concept of God.
To make an affirmation that within a given field of meanings is
unwarranted (i.e., breaks the rules) and that changes our larger fields of
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meanings is an example of what Gerhart and Russell call metaphoric
process. The process of forcing analogies creates the possibility to say
things that could not otherwise be said. It creates new conceptual and
logical space. They maintain that the same kind of thing happened in
the history of science. Newton equated earthly and heavenly mechanics.
Copernicus insisted that the sun is the center of our solar system, not
the earth. William Thomson and James Prescott Joule asserted that heat
is motion. Einstein affirmed that Galileo's concept of relativity applied
not only to mechanical phenomena but to electromagnetic phenomena
as well, leading to his metaphoric insistence that the laws of physics and
the speed of light are the same for all observers regardless of their
position or motion.73 These affirmations, unwarranted in the science of
the day, fundamentally changed the larger fields of meanings. These
metaphoric affirmations created conceptual and logical possibilities for
imagining, conceiving, and talking about things that before the metaphoric act were unavailable, and that even after it can seem quite
counterintuitive. Hence, in speaking of "metaphoric process," Gerhart
and Russell are not speaking of the sort of figurative language that we
often have in mind when we speak of "metaphors."
It is also important to note that the forced analogy and alteration in fields
of meanings in such cases are not necessarily at the level of concepts. In the
instance of Aquinas's affirmation that God is simple, the shifts in fields of
meanings are an implication of a move that Burrell characterizes as grammatical. Aquinas uses "simplicity," although grammatically a substantive,
as shorthand for denying that any substantives, at least as we know them,
can apply to God. Aquinas's affirmation that the nature of God is esse
operates at a deeper level, since to display and speak of what is beyond
language's grasp he forces an identity between the grammatical logic of
asserting and the grammatical logic of predicating.
Rahner's Metaphoric Conception of Analogy

When Rahner speaks of analogy in the crucial text that Burke cites from
Foundations and claims that transcendental experience is original and primary, he is making just such a metaphoric move. That there appears to be no
prime analogue in the sense Burke expects is not an indication of a weak
conceptual basis for the analogy Rahner is making between created reality
and God. Rather, it is a clue that Rahner is making a logical move that Burke
misses. It is a move that parallels Aquinas's—and for the same reason. It is an
appeal to analogy, but not to the kind of analogy between concepts that
Burke supposes. While Burke acknowledges that "transcendental Thomism
73
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stressed man's intuitive, non-conceptual grasp of reality,' he takes this only
as affirming greater emphasis on the nonconceptual (conceived as one side of
a dialectic between the conceptual and nonconceptual) rather than as a
radical reconfiguration of what constitutes knowing in the first place. But
Rahner is not merely offering an apophatic reminder of God's transcendence. He holds that our concepts for God have a fundamentally different
logical status than concepts about other realities. Even to use the phrases
"other realities" or "concepts" with respect to God is misleading. God
conceived as "the one ultimate measure cannot be measured" or grasped
conceptually in the conventional senses of the terms.75
Rahner explains this difference of logic in language reminiscent of
BurrelPs interpretation of Aquinas: since the ultimate measure "is the
condition of possibility for all categorized distinctions and divisions, it
cannot itself be distinguished from other things by the same modes of
distinction."76 That is why Rahner insists, in the quote cited by Burke, that
analogy is not based on some similarity discerned in concepts but rather in
our existential relationship to the incomprehensibility of God as Holy
Mystery. We ourselves exist analogously in and through our being grounded
in this Holy Mystery, which always surpasses us.77 Our reflexive awareness of
our knowing, loving, and freedom reveals a kind of anticipation or intimation
{Vorgriff) of a "whither" that always exceeds our conceptual grasp. It is this
reflexive awareness that enables us to speak of that incomprehensible Other,
but without thereby grasping in concepts the One we anticipate. In other
words, we can identify the "whither" of our transcendence in terms of our
movement in knowing, loving, and self-commitment. We can speak of that
Other toward which knowing, freedom, and love move as our "horizon,"
"term," or "goal." In doing so our concepts have not literally described or
directly grasped God. For all that we truly grasp conceptually is ourselves
and the openness of our spirit outward beyond ourselves toward an Other
beyond our reach. Yet this does enable genuine predication.
"Analogical" for Rahner indicates this radically indirect and reflexive
manner of predication. God "can be spoken of only in a qualitatively
different kind of statement."78 Like Burrell, Rahner argues with respect
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to the statement "God is" that it "is not a proposition which one can
range alongside other propositions which constitute science" or ordinary
language. Its logic is of an "utterly different kind."79 This reflexive
knowledge, he argues, is not secondary or inferior to our grasp of entities
in objective concepts, but rather is the necessary condition of possibility
for such objectifications—their flip side, as it were—and, in a sense, more
original.
This fits Gerhart and Russell's conception of a metaphoric act because
Rahner forces an analogy between two "knowns" that changes the larger
field of meanings. The first known is what Rahner calls "transcendental
knowing"—or more accurately, the transcendental moment of knowing:
the reflexive, indirect presence-to-self and anticipation (Vorgriff) of the
horizon of knowing, love, and freedom. The second known is the knowledge of objects or categorial moment in knowing. Rahner forces an
analogy by insisting against conventional understanding that the primary
model for conceptualizing how we understand "knowing" should be the
transcendental moment rather than the categorial moment. The former is
not a derivative, secondary, or inferior way of knowing. Forcing the
analogy, that is to say, speaking of God as known transcendentally rather
than categorially, creates a logical space for talking of God, even though
as Holy Mystery God is still beyond our grasp and so can be spoken
of only in this indirect metaphoric way. The logic of God-talk is
governed by the intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness of this metaphoric
signification.
If this intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness is forgotten, one is liable to
fall into the mistaken notion that transcendental reality is a transcendental
"object" that can be known, spoken of, or described in concepts the way
we conceptualize categorial objects. Rahner's use of terms like "Holy
Mystery," "nameless whither," "horizon," and "asymptotic goal" are meant
to call attention to this metaphoric shift in signification. Moreover, characteristic of metaphoric signification, affirming that God is transcendental
reality effects fundamental and global changes in the available theological
and metaphysical fields of meanings. The difficulty with Burke's reinterpretation is not that he considers and rejects this metaphoric move, but that he
appears to miss it altogether. Much the same difficulty is inherent in Kilby's
nonfoundationalist reading. Rahner's appeal to the transcendental is not
aimed at establishing an entirely independent philosophical foundation for
God-talk but rather at reconfiguring how we think and talk about God in
the first place. Missing this metaphoric move skews not only his understanding of analogy but the fundamental logic of his thought.
79
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The Metaphoric Logic of Rahner's Thought

Many of the statements that Kilby and Burke interpret as paradoxes to
which Rahner's thought inevitably leads are key articulations of the metaphoric logic at the heart of his philosophical and theological vision. To
interpret his thought, it is necessary to trace how he employs these unexpected and "unwarranted" affirmations to open up new conceptual possibilities. In fact, the best Rahner scholarship often does this implicitly, but
without attention to the metaphoric character of these conceptual moves.
Focusing more explicitly on this metaphoric aspect of his moves and explicating their logic clarify what is going on in Rahner's thought that is often
missed. Hence my argument that analyzing the metaphoric logic of
Rahner's thought is a crucial interpretive step, one that explains why
Rahner's meaning is misunderstood even in reinterpretations such as
Kilby's and Burke's that aim to be conscientious as well as critical.
It would be possible to explore all the central motifs of Rahner's theology attentive to its metaphoric logic. For example, he opens up new conceptual space in epistemology with the metaphoric claim that "the supreme
act of knowledge is not the abolition or diminution of the mystery but its
final assertion, its eternal and total immediacy."80 At the heart of his
Christology are several crucial metaphoric claims: that "the closeness and
the distance . . . of the creature and God do not grow in inverse but like
proportion";81 that "Christ is most radically man, and his humanity is the
freest and most independent, not in spite of, but because of its being taken
up, by being constituted as the self-utterance of God";82 that symbol and
analogy are based originally in the self-expressiveness of be-ing rather than
in any likeness between beings; and that there is an identity between the
Realsymbol and what it symbolizes.83 Then there is also the identity of
the economic and immanent Trinity; the priority of uncreated grace over
created grace; the identity of love of God and love of neighbor; and a
sacramental causality that has retrospective consequences. Of course, recognizing such claims as metaphoric as such does not prove them true. But
understanding how they purport to be true (that is to say, how they work
logically and conceptually) is a necessary first step toward any further
assessment of their truth and coherence. It would require a monograph,
at the least, to explicate such metaphoric moves in Rahner's thought.
80
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The contrast just discussed between Rahner's metaphoric understanding of
analogy and Burke's reinterpretation offers an illustration. In lieu of a
comprehensive analysis, I offer two more.
Identification of God and Being-As-Such

I mentioned earlier that Burke regards Thomas Sheehan's "atheological"
reading of Rahner as one that undermines the very possibility of doctrine
and objective truth claims. I share reservations about Sheehan's interpretation but not Burke's conclusion that Sheehan's reading stems from a weakness inherent in Rahner's philosophical stance. Rather, Sheehan's reading is
problematic for the same reason that Burke's is. He also misses, or at the
minimum implicitly refuses to follow, Rahner's metaphoric logic. This argument, which I have made at length elsewhere, can be recapped briefly.84
The issue centers around Rahner's identification of God and being-assuch. Sheehan probes the Heideggerian roots of this notion in Rahner and
concludes that the "baggage" Rahner brings as a believer and from Thomism undermines the insights he derived from Heidegger. The evidence,
however, indicates to the contrary that Rahner forced an identification
of meanings that for traditional Thomist metaphysicians and strict
Heideggerians are incommensurable. He stretched language and thought
to create conceptual space to say something new. In identifying God as the
Holy Mystery who claims us but always remains beyond our grasp, Rahner
transforms both the conventional Thomist and Heideggerian fields of
meanings. His is not simply the inherited neo-Thomist metaphysical conception of God. His is not merely a Heideggerian recessiveness that
bespeaks only the claim of finite transcendence. Rahner's metaphoric handling of what he received from Aquinas and Heidegger enables him to
extract from both of them (both against the conventional interpretations
of their meanings and in continuity with them) a recognition of our movement toward a horizon that is always ahead of our grasp. In this way
Rahner uncovers a "clearing"—an "openness"—within which it is possible
to recognize that we are claimed by the mystery of God. Rahner, like
Aquinas, handles the "baggage" his faith tradition offers, not as burdensome freight, but as a rich, supple vocabulary and grammar for theological
reflection—a vocabulary and grammar capacious enough to appropriate
insights from Heidegger and Aquinas, just as Aquinas found ways to appropriate both neo-Platonic and Aristotelian insights.
Where Sheehan reads Rahner as unfaithful to his Heideggerian roots,
Burke, following McDermott, reads him as unfaithful to his Thomist and
metaphysical roots. Sheehan and Burke presume, correctly, I think, that if
84
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narrowly interpreted, Heidegger's thought and Thomist metaphysics are
incommensurable worlds of meanings. Kilby expresses similar reservations,
noting that "almost everyone" who has examined Spirit in the World as a
reading of Aquinas, "beginning with Rahner's own thesis director, has
found it wanting." 85 Likewise she agrees that those who try to read Spirit
in the World "as a fundamentally Heideggerian work . . . are forced to see
Rahner as a very confused Heideggerian."86 Sheehan and Burke also
assume—but here I disagree—that the only alternatives are to adopt a
narrowly circumscribed version of one or the other position, or to subsume
one position into the other. From their respective perspectives they show
(and also instantiate) that the latter options are doomed to failure. Rahner
follows the alternative that they do not consider: he explores whether an
original and different world of meanings can be created by forcing an
unexpected analogy here. This is the sort of conceptual move characteristic
of much of Rahner's thought that I propose as a clearer hermeneutical clue
to its philosophical coherence and theological balance.
Missing and Rejecting a Metaphoric Move Not the Same

The question here, I stress, is not whether Sheehan or Burke would agree
with Rahner's conceptual move. My claim is that neither has recognized it.
Missing it and rejecting it are not the same thing, although I have little
doubt that if Burke or Sheehan were to accept the clarifications I offer
here, they would still object to Rahner's line of reasoning. But in that case,
there would nevertheless be greater clarity about what is being rejected and
on what grounds.
Let me explain a bit further. For those who have read Rahner closely and
follow his conceptual moves, it is problematic and puzzling that other
thoughtful commentators, such as Kilby, Burke, and Sheehan, come to
readings so contrary to the presumptive meanings and conventional interpretations of Rahner's thought. For conventional Rahnerians such critiques
seem more to misrepresent than to miss the point. Likewise, Kilby and
Burke attribute to Rahnerians unjustified harmonization of ambiguities, as
well as interpretations that allegedly go beyond anything Rahner himself
would have countenanced. Sheehan, for his part, has no hesitation about
going beyond Rahner in such ways. Still, missing the point is not the same
as misrepresenting or rejecting a point. Metaphoric moves, because they
make unexpected and uncalled for uses of conventional terms can easily be
missed. It is not even necessary that those who propose a metaphoric
affirmation are themselves explicitly conscious at a theoretical level that
what they are doing is metaphoric. At the same time, however, reception
Kilby, Karl Rahner 14.
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(although again not necessarily in a self-conscious way) is a crucial element
in metaphoric affirmations. The new meanings and logical entailments are
available only to those who are "alive to them"—who are able and willing
to accept the reframed field of meanings. It is always possible that one
might not "get the point."87
Rahner's Transcendental Perspective: Metaphoric
Rather Than Foundationalist

Not getting the point appears to be the case with Kilby's contention that
Rahner's argument in Hearer of the Word precludes the notion of transcendental revelation in his later theology and that it conflicts with the notion of
a supernatural existential. Her argument hinges on two claims: (1) that
Hearer of the Word postulates a sharp either/or opposition between revelation and that which is accessible to human knowing; and (2) that the
conceptions in his later theology of transcendental revelation and the
supernatural existential entail that God is in fact accessible to human
knowing, however imperfectly.
But Kilby's argument for a sharp either/or opposition between revelation
and what is accessible to human knowing misses a crucial distinction. The
logic of "transcendental" applied to "knowledge" in Spirit in the World and
Hearer of the Word differs in a significant way when applied to "revelation"
and when presumed in the notion of the supernatural existential. In
Rahner's early philosophical works, his argument is not that some specific
categorial experience presupposes and anticipates God as the nameless
whither of knowing, willing, and loving, but that any categorial experience
of human knowing, willing, and loving entails this dynamism of the spirit.
Indeed, it is essential to understand that when Rahner talks about an
experience of God, he is not talking about some specific experience but
87
One sees this lack of reception played out frequently in discussion in popular
culture of the Christian claim that Jesus is the Messiah or in the disputes over
creation and evolution. Given the images current in the eschatology of Jesus' day,
affirming that God was victorious in the crucified son of a craftsman from Nazareth
was wholly unexpected. In fact, most of the key eschatological images by which
Jesus is identified in the Gospels have something of this metaphoric dimension. By
ordinary logic he was not a victorious King of Israel, a Son of Man who descended
gloriously from the heavens, or acknowledged by his people for vanquishing their
enemies. To affirm that Jesus is the Messiah is to force an analogy between him and
Israel's expressions of hope and trust in God. This in turn requires a different
understanding of God, Israel's hope, and Jesus. Affirming that Jesus is the Messiah
forces a thoroughgoing revision of the field of meanings operative in the narrative
worlds of the Bible. In an argument between a skeptical historian and a fundamentalist Christian, both parties miss what is really at issue, just as debates between
creationists and their secular opponents miss what is affirmed in the metaphoric
affirmation that God is creator.
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rather about a dimension that qualifies all experiences of the human
spirit.88 Strictly speaking, "transcendental" and "categorial" do not designate two different ways of knowing, willing, or loving but rather two sides
of the same activity. There is never one without the other. One never
escapes the necessity of conversion to the phantasms.
When this distinction is at issue, the scenario Kilby envisions applies.
Rahner's argument for a transcendental knowledge of God as a nameless
whither who could speak or remain silent entails that, no matter how
unconscious and anonymous this knowledge, it is humanly accessible, at
least in principle. That is to say, it is something given with human experience as such, and something in theory that humans could bring to consciousness at least imperfectly for themselves. But it must be noted that
this transcendental knowing of God entails no self-disclosure of God. God
known in this way is "grasped at" only as the nameless whither that could
reveal itself or remain silent.
Something different is envisioned in Rahner's conception of the supernatural existential and the related notion of a transcendental revelation.
A theological postulate (belief that Jesus' life, death, and resurrection
constitute God's definitive self-communication) reframes the conceptual
world of Spirit in the World and Hearer of the Word. In his theological
works, Rahner is inquiring about the transcendental presuppositions of
that revelation in history rather than about the transcendental presuppositions of categorial experience in general. In the philosophical analysis,
"transcendental" and "categorial" specify inseparable flip sides of human
experience as such. In the theological works, "transcendental" specifies
the inseparable flip side of the particular events that constitute salvation
history. The conception of a supernatural existential and transcendental
revelation is possible only retrospectively because of what God has
wrought in Jesus and the Spirit, and because this has been made known
to us in Scripture and tradition. The mutual interaction between the
transcendental and categorial still applies. There is no transcendental
dimension or divine self-communication for us without the categorial
events of salvation history and their culmination in Jesus' life, death,
and resurrection. Transcendental revelation and the supernatural existential require those specific categorial events, not just any categorial
events whatsoever.
Kilby suggests that a transcendental revelation and supernatural existential mean that God's self-communication is "part of the ordinary
human makeup, accessible, however imperfectly, to ordinary means of

For a helpful discussion of this see Rik Van Nieuwenhove, "Karl Rahner,
Theologian of the Experience of God?" Louvain Studies 29 (2004) 92-106.
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knowledge.' This suggestion presupposes that it might be possible to
escape this interdependence of the transcendental dimension of God's
self-communication and the actual historical self-disclosure itself in the
categorial events of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. But for Rahner the
interdependence is both ontological and epistemic. Jesus' life, death, and
resurrection not only reveal God's self-communication; they constitute it.
In this sense, apart from these events there can be nothing remotely like
Kilby's "accessing" God's self-communication by ordinary means of knowledge, imperfectly or otherwise. In this sense, apart from those events, there
is no divine self-communication. This is a crucial implication of Rahner's
conception of the Realsymbol and what he later refers to as "sacramental
causality" and "sign causality."90 These notions, which presume Rahner's
metaphoric assertion of a causality that has retrospective consequences, are
already implicit in Spirit in the World's "metaphysics of the emanation of
the faculties from the soul."91
So this difference in principle between the transcendental knowledge of
God as the nameless whither of the human spirit and the transcendental
revelation of God as self-disclosing mystery is implicit in the logic of Spirit in
the World and Hearer of the Word. Moreover, the difference is not altered by
the fact that it is God, not two different realities, who is intended in both cases.
Nor is the difference altered by Rahner's subsequent argument, with the
notion of the supernatural existential, that God's free self-disclosure must
have been a factor in human existence from the beginning, and must be a
factor in human existence generally. The first distinction provides a logic for
talking about God apart from faith—that is to say, in a way that does not
presuppose God's self-disclosure or knowledge of that self-disclosure as
grounds for the discussion. The second distinction provides a logic that
reframes the former in unexpected and even uncalled for ways in the light of
God's self-disclosure and the Christian tradition's understanding of that selfdisclosure. In this latter context, it can be said that grace and God's selfdisclosure are at least anonymously accessible to all humanity—but still only
in virtue of Christ. This conceptual move is metaphoric because it reframes
things in such unexpected ways, opening up space in which it is possible to say
both that there is no grace apart from Christ and that grace is universally
available, at least as offer. This conceptual move is retrospective, or transcendental, because its refraining is possible only in light of what happened in Jesus
and the Christian understanding of that. It is theological for the same reason.
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Rahner's appeal to the transcendental was aimed as much at clarifying how
we think and talk about God as at justifying the legitimacy of such talk. His
goal, as Endean explains, was never to establish an independent philosophical
foundation for theology.92 But this did not mean that the role of philosophy
must collapse into theology or be abandoned. The distinction Rahner proposed between the transcendental and categorial moments of knowing was
properly philosophical, and he made it for distinctly philosophical, as well as
theological, reasons. Clearly one can investigate, without appealing to faith or
revelation, the question about whether the ineffable "whither" of human
knowing, freedom, and love can be grasped as other realities are grasped, or
whether all talk of this "whither" must entail a fundamentally different and
more basic kind of reflexive, indirect, nonconceptual sort of "knowing." This
latter solution, Rahner's distinction between the transcendental and
categorial knowing, is radical because it reframes standard ways of thinking
with the unexpected implication that knowing is at its roots, and most basically, nonconceptual, nonthematic, and nonobjective.
Robert Sokolowski has argued persuasively that making just such distinctions is precisely the task of philosophy.93 Even in metaphysics, he
contends, "the decisive philosophical move is made by distinctions, not by
reasoning from effects to causes."94 There is as much evidence for
interpreting Rahner's appeal to the transcendental along these lines as
there is for interpreting it as foundationalist in the narrow sense that Kilby
eschews. One can argue philosophically for or against the distinctions
Rahner proposes, contend that some are more plausible and others
unpersuasive, or propose alternative distinctions. This activity is properly
philosophical because it need not appeal to justifications grounded in religious beliefs. Moreover, making such distinctions even within a theological
context is properly philosophical insofar as it prescinds from justifications
that appeal to religious beliefs. On the other hand, while distinctions
reached through such efforts might play very helpful roles in theological
reflection and contribute to conceptual clarification, consistency, and plausibility, there is no necessity to assume with Kilby that they intend to
establish an independent foundation for faith. Nor is there any necessity
to assume with Kilby that theological arguments "grounded" in such efforts
at philosophical perspicuity and consistency are "grounding" in the
foundationalist or semifoundationalist senses she eschews. She admits
that Rahner was not consciously or directly addressing the issue of
92
See Karl Rahner "Philosophy and Theology," TI 6:71-81 [ST 6:91-103]; and
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foundationalism as such. But the weight of her objections to Spirit in the
World and Hearer of the Word, as unpersuasive and as contradicted by his
later theology, hinges to a large extent on her premise that those works must
be read as foundationalist. Hence her appeal to interpretations that are often
against the obvious meaning of the textual evidence and against Rahner's
intent are no more cogent than this problematic interpretive premise.
HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
A METAPHORIC READING OF RAHNER

Of course, asserting that Kilby's critique misinterprets Rahner's metaphoric moves as foundational does not attend to important questions she
raises about the persuasiveness of his distinctions or about the cogency of
his arguments for them. Likewise, I have hardly touched on the many issues
that Burke presses Rahnerians to address. All that I have tackled here is a
more preliminary question about how Kilby's and Burke's readings of
Rahner's theology are framed. My point in arguing for an alternative interpretive scheme has not been to urge that there is only one correct way to
read Rahner or assess whether his thought is balanced. Given the significant changes in historical, intellectual, and theological contexts, it is imperative to interpret his thought today in dialogue with new interlocutors and
questions—to read him, as it were, from the outside and from multiple
perspectives. My evaluation of the reinterpretations of Kilby, Burke, and
Endean has been narrowly circumscribed. It intends an alternative reading
that aims at doing justice to the integrity of Rahner's thought and at the
same time aims to explain how serious interpreters can advance such different readings. The thrust of my suggestion can be summarized in five
hermeneutical principles for reading Rahner:
(1) Interpreting Rahner requires taking the metaphoric character of his
thought into account and carefully attending to its logic. This is especially important when his conceptual moves reframe the conventional
theological terrain.
(2) Given the way Rahner transforms the many sources and inspirations of
his thought and his extraordinary creativity in refraining the theological
questions he investigates, a genetic interpretation should give a relative
priority to the later work over the earlier. This principle contrasts with
Burke's procedure which gives hegemony to Rahner's early philosophical
work and neo-Scholastic sources for interpreting the direction of his
thought. If an architect is constructing a revolutionary kind of building,
one cannot tell in advance which structures will be foundational. In arguing for a retrospective hermeneutics I intend to assert, however, only a
Kilby, Karl Rahner 100.
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relative priority. Obviously genetic information—for example, Endean's
point about the genesis of Rahner's epistemology in his early reflections
on grace—can have immense significance for an accurate reading.
(3) For the same reasons, relative priority should be given to an internal
reading. This should not be an excuse for denying ambiguities in
Rahner's work or its limitations, but it does caution against readings
like Kilby's that are contrary to the presumptive meaning of what
Rahner says, or readings that emphasize consistency with one or
another text over principles of consistency that emerge from the whole
of Rahner's work.
(4) Significance should always be given to Rahner's performance as well as
to his theoretical and methodological pronouncements. Rahner, for
example, never worked out an explicit theory of analogy. In his
published writings apart from a very early article, he says little about
Heidegger. He said nothing explicitly about the sort of metaphoric
logic I have attributed to his thought. In the first instance, interpretation must rely on attentive analysis of his actual appeals to analogy and
uses of analogous language. In the second instance, interpretation must
discern where Rahner follows Heidegger's lead and where he takes a
different direction. In the third instance, the justifications I have
offered for the metaphoric logic of Rahner's thought are based on
analysis of how he argues rather than on any explicit statement in his
arguments about metaphoric process.
(5) The case I suggest for a retrospective hermeneutic of Rahner's metaphoric moves attentive to its internal coherence and actual execution
should not be taken as an effort somehow to isolate Rahner's theology
from the sort of theological and dogmatic criteria of accuracy and truth
that must be applied to all theological claims. To argue that a conceptual
move is metaphoric is not to prove it true or to dodge the question of
truth but only to make a claim about how it purports to be true. So it is
not illegitimate for Burke to ask whether Rahner's "emphasis on Christ's
humanity really encompasses the traditional Christology of the Church,
as he claimed it did." On the other hand, to answer a question such as
this legitimately, it is crucial to make sure that Rahner's metaphoric logic
has been taken into account and not simply missed or dismissed.96
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